Alas, even philosophers get ill from time to time, and not just from consuming bad logic. Having read your comments on last night's blog posting, I'm getting the sense that a great many of you find ethical relativism appealing - and not just appealing, but
right.
Ahhh....verrrry, verrry interesting.
I did note one or two minor hesitations: for example, Alyssa T.'s comment included the caveat "I do believe that there are some things, such as murder and rape, that are just plan [sic] wrong regardless of morals".
Now that you've all given serious thought to the issue, and come up with your very best reasons for believing as you do, here's tonight's prompt for your (HW) comments:
Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems to me that, if I accept ethical relativism, I should allow everyone to "do their own thing," and my having a different (moral) opinion than someone else doesn't give me any right to impose my own morals on him or her. I wonder, then,
on what basis could we possibly call murder and rape "wrong," if morals are nothing but personal opinion? Put another way, if I think that (at least
sometimes) I should interfere with someone else's actions, and prevent his or her doing something (say, committing rape or murder or genocide), how can I justify my interference, if moral principles are merely opinions?
And to
really bake your noodle: if I decide to simply stand back and allow something I consider wrong to happen (without interfering), aren't I just doing exactly what ethical relativism says I should? On what basis, for example, would
Paul Rusesabagina have a legitimate moral reason for doing as he did - interfering with the moral beliefs of the Hutu regime?